Currently, securing information exchange over public channels, like the internet, relies on Public Key Cryptography, such as RSA. However, with the continual advancements in computing power and the possibility of an operational quantum computer becoming a reality in the near future, the security of these cryptographic schemes could be compromised. Symmetric key cryptography (SKC) using reasonably long key length is assumed to be quantum-secure, however, the problem lies in securing the initial key exchange between the parties involved. In order to address this challenge Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed. However, one of the major drawbacks of current state-of-the-art QKD systems is that they require dedicated and specialized peer-to-peer communication links which require careful maintenance and calibration to ensure quantum-coherence and are not scalable for internet-scale key distribution. As a result, communications involving lightweight IoT devices with resource constraints will still be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To overcome this challenge, I propose a novel class of quantum secure symmetric key distribution protocols, that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers.

The proposed Self-powered Timer Key Distribution (SPoTKD) protocol uses publicly available identical copies of self-powered timer chipsets where the temporal dynamics of the timers on these chipsets are synchronized with its software clone running on a server. I will describe the basic hardware security primitives of these chipsets which will make them immune to any potential side channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. I will show how the keys which are derived from the temporal dynamics of the timers meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) criteria. Based on the keys generated I will then propose the SPoTKD protocol that exploit the synchronization between hardware timer and its software clone where time-evolution is used to implement a secure one-way function. I will show the security of these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, I will also show the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts. I propose to investigate a System-on-chip (SOC) for SPoTKD protocol that will satisfy all the underlying hardware security primitives. I will investigate the robustness of the hardware implementation w.r.t temperature and environmental variations and how they will affect the overall performance of SPoTKD. I will also investigate methods to generate unique keys and signatures using single electron dynamics in SPoTKD hardware that will further enhance the security of SPoTKD protocols.                                    

Currently, securing information exchange over public channels, like the internet, relies on Public Key Cryptography, such as RSA. However, with the continual advancements in computing power and the possibility of an operational quantum computer becoming a reality in the near future, the security of these cryptographic schemes could be compromised. Symmetric key cryptography (SKC) using reasonably long key length is assumed to be quantum-secure, however, the problem lies in securing the initial key exchange between the parties involved. In order to address this challenge Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed. However, one of the major drawbacks of current state-of-the-art QKD systems is that they require dedicated and specialized peer-to-peer communication links which require careful maintenance and calibration to ensure quantum-coherence and are not scalable for internet-scale key distribution. As a result, communications involving lightweight IoT devices with resource constraints will still be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To overcome this challenge, I propose a novel class of quantum secure symmetric key distribution protocols, that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers.

The proposed Self-powered Timer Key Distribution (SPoTKD) protocol uses publicly available identical copies of self-powered timer chipsets where the temporal dynamics of the timers on these chipsets are synchronized with its software clone running on a server. I will describe the basic hardware security primitives of these chipsets which will make them immune to any potential side channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. I will show how the keys which are derived from the temporal dynamics of the timers meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) criteria. Based on the keys generated I will then propose the SPoTKD protocol that exploit the synchronization between hardware timer and its software clone where time-evolution is used to implement a secure one-way function. I will show the security of these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, I will also show the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts. I propose to investigate a System-on-chip (SOC) for SPoTKD protocol that will satisfy all the underlying hardware security primitives. I will investigate the robustness of the hardware implementation w.r.t temperature and environmental variations and how they will affect the overall performance of SPoTKD. I will also investigate methods to generate unique keys and signatures using single electron dynamics in SPoTKD hardware that will further enhance the security of SPoTKD protocols.                                    

Currently, securing information exchange over public channels, like the internet, relies on Public Key Cryptography, such as RSA. However, with the continual advancements in computing power and the possibility of an operational quantum computer becoming a reality in the near future, the security of these cryptographic schemes could be compromised. Symmetric key cryptography (SKC) using reasonably long key length is assumed to be quantum-secure, however, the problem lies in securing the initial key exchange between the parties involved. In order to address this challenge Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed. However, one of the major drawbacks of current state-of-the-art QKD systems is that they require dedicated and specialized peer-to-peer communication links which require careful maintenance and calibration to ensure quantum-coherence and are not scalable for internet-scale key distribution. As a result, communications involving lightweight IoT devices with resource constraints will still be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To overcome this challenge, I propose a novel class of quantum secure symmetric key distribution protocols, that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers.

The proposed Self-powered Timer Key Distribution (SPoTKD) protocol uses publicly available identical copies of self-powered timer chipsets where the temporal dynamics of the timers on these chipsets are synchronized with its software clone running on a server. I will describe the basic hardware security primitives of these chipsets which will make them immune to any potential side channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. I will show how the keys which are derived from the temporal dynamics of the timers meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) criteria. Based on the keys generated I will then propose the SPoTKD protocol that exploit the synchronization between hardware timer and its software clone where time-evolution is used to implement a secure one-way function. I will show the security of these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, I will also show the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts. I propose to investigate a System-on-chip (SOC) for SPoTKD protocol that will satisfy all the underlying hardware security primitives. I will investigate the robustness of the hardware implementation w.r.t temperature and environmental variations and how they will affect the overall performance of SPoTKD. I will also investigate methods to generate unique keys and signatures using single electron dynamics in SPoTKD hardware that will further enhance the security of SPoTKD protocols.                                    

Currently, securing information exchange over public channels, like the internet, relies on Public Key Cryptography, such as RSA. However, with the continual advancements in computing power and the possibility of an operational quantum computer becoming a reality in the near future, the security of these cryptographic schemes could be compromised. Symmetric key cryptography (SKC) using reasonably long key length is assumed to be quantum-secure, however, the problem lies in securing the initial key exchange between the parties involved. In order to address this challenge Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed. However, one of the major drawbacks of current state-of-the-art QKD systems is that they require dedicated and specialized peer-to-peer communication links which require careful maintenance and calibration to ensure quantum-coherence and are not scalable for internet-scale key distribution. As a result, communications involving lightweight IoT devices with resource constraints will still be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To overcome this challenge, I propose a novel class of quantum secure symmetric key distribution protocols, that leverages basic security primitives offered by low-cost, hardware chipsets containing millions of synchronized self-powered timers.

The proposed Self-powered Timer Key Distribution (SPoTKD) protocol uses publicly available identical copies of self-powered timer chipsets where the temporal dynamics of the timers on these chipsets are synchronized with its software clone running on a server. I will describe the basic hardware security primitives of these chipsets which will make them immune to any potential side channel attacks, malicious tampering, or snooping. I will show how the keys which are derived from the temporal dynamics of the timers meet the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) criteria. Based on the keys generated I will then propose the SPoTKD protocol that exploit the synchronization between hardware timer and its software clone where time-evolution is used to implement a secure one-way function. I will show the security of these protocols under standard model and against different adversarial attacks. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, I will also show the robustness of these protocols in the presence of real-world operating conditions and propose error-correcting SPoTKD protocols to mitigate these noise-related artifacts. I propose to investigate a System-on-chip (SOC) for SPoTKD protocol that will satisfy all the underlying hardware security primitives. I will investigate the robustness of the hardware implementation w.r.t temperature and environmental variations and how they will affect the overall performance of SPoTKD. I will also investigate methods to generate unique keys and signatures using single electron dynamics in SPoTKD hardware that will further enhance the security of SPoTKD protocols.