Abstract, joint work with Ron Siegel: We consider a single-product market that may be segmented into several market segments each served by a single seller. The price that the seller optimally charges in a segment, and thus the surplus of each consumer, depends on the set of consumers in that segment. We consider the market segmentations that result from a cooperative game between consumers. We study several solution concepts that differ in the kind of coalitions of consumers that can object to a proposed segmentation. 

Read full abstract on Arts & Sciences website.

LECTURE: Zoom Virtual Meeting Room
Passcode: 094713

Abstract, joint work with Ron Siegel: We consider a single-product market that may be segmented into several market segments each served by a single seller. The price that the seller optimally charges in a segment, and thus the surplus of each consumer, depends on the set of consumers in that segment. We consider the market segmentations that result from a cooperative game between consumers. We study several solution concepts that differ in the kind of coalitions of consumers that can object to a proposed segmentation. 

Read full abstract on Arts & Sciences website.

LECTURE: Zoom Virtual Meeting Room
Passcode: 094713